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REFUSING To COMPARE APPLES AND ORANGES: WHY THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT GOT IT RIGHT IN UNITED STATES V. DIVENS*
INTRODUCTION
In United States v. Divens,' the Fourth Circuit reviewed a
defendant's appeal challenging the U.S. District Court for the
Southern District of West Virginia's decision at sentencing that
allowed the Government to withhold an extra acceptance of
responsibility reduction2  under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines ("Guidelines") section 3E1.1(b).3 The Fourth Circuit
reached a "very interesting and perhaps somewhat surprising" result4:
it vacated the defendant's sentence and remanded the case for further
* © 2012 Tziporah Schwartz Tapp.
1. 650 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2011).
2. The United States Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") contain a Sentencing
Table, which determines the defendant's sentencing range in months. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2010). A defendant's sentencing range is based primarily on
two factors: (1) the offense level, which is determined by the defendant's conduct
associated with the offense; and (2) the defendant's criminal history category. Id. The
court may sentence a defendant within the range. Id. § 1BI.1. In determining the
appropriate sentencing range, the Guidelines provide for adjustments based on "specific
offense characteristics" and Guideline instructions. Id. § 1B1.1(a). These adjustments
"provide very few means by which a defendant can reduce his offense level and,
ultimately, his advisory sentencing range. One opportunity, generally known as acceptance
of responsibility, is provided by U.S.S.G. [section] 3E1.1." Brief of Appellant at 8, United
States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-4967). Section 3E1.1 provides one
such adjustment by reducing the defendant's offense level for the defendant's acceptance
of responsibility. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 (2010). Specifically,
section 3E1.1(a) decreases the offense level by two levels, and section 3E1.1(b) decreases
the offense level by one additional level. Id. Thus, the reduction under section 3E1.1(b) is
referred to as either the "extra acceptance of responsibility" reduction, the "additional
level" reduction, or the "third point" reduction. See id. § 3E1.l; United States v. Detwiler,
338 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (D. Or. 2004); Douglas A. Berman, Fourth Circuit (Splitting
with Other Circuits) Finds Problem with Appeal Waiver Demand for Extra Acceptance
Reduction, SENT'G L. & POL'Y BLOG (July 5, 2011, 5:12 PM), http://sentencing.typepad
.com/sentencing__law and-policy/2011/07/fourth-circuit-splitting-with-other-circuits-finds-
problem-with-appeal-wavier-demand-for-extra-accep.html.
3. Divens, 650 F.3d at 344; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b)
(2010) (stating that the extra acceptance of responsibility reduction is for a defendant who
"has assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by
timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the government and the court to
allocate their resources efficiently").
4. Berman, supra note 2.
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proceedings.' The court ruled that the Government could not base its
refusal to move for the extra acceptance of responsibility reduction
on a defendant's refusal to waive appellate rights.6 It refused to
analogize section 3E1.1(b) to section 5K1.1.7 Section 5K1.18 provides
for a downward departure9 upon a Government's motion stating
"that the defendant has provided substantial assistance" to the
Government. 10 In doing so, the Fourth Circuit split with the First,1'
Fifth, 2  Seventh, 13  and Ninth Circuits, 4  which all allow the
Government broad discretion under section 3E1.1(b). 15 The Fourth
Circuit narrowed the Government's discretion under section 3E1.1(b)
to determine whether the defendant "timely" entered a "plea of
guilty."'6
This Recent Development argues that, despite creating a circuit
split, the Fourth Circuit's refusal to allow prosecutors to condition the
extra sentence reduction on a defendant's waiver of the right to
appeal was correct. The court's analysis is logical, clear, and furthers
the Guidelines' purpose of conserving scarce trial resources. Divens
also reinforces other objectives that the criminal adjudication system
values: predictability and certainty in federal sentencing. 7 The extra
5. Divens, 650 F.3d at 344.
6. Id. at 347.
7. Id. at 345-46.
8. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1 (1989).
9. In light of the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005), federal courts use a three-step sentencing analysis. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N,
SELECTED DEPARTURE AND VARIANCE DECISIONS 1 (Mar. 2011), available at http://
www.ussc.gov/Legal/Primers/PrimerDeparture-and-Variance.pdf. "First, the court
should apply the sentencing guidelines to establish the sentencing guideline range. Gall v.
United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007).... Second, the court should determine whether a
departure is consistent with the guidelines. See, e.g., United States v. McBride, 434 F.3d 470
(6th Cir. 2006) ..." Id. Departures are allowed in cases that deviate from the standard
cases. Id. "Third, the court should determine whether a variance (a sentence outside the
advisory guideline system) is warranted under the authority of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)." Id.
10. Divens, 650 F.3d at 345 (citing Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181, 185 (1992)).
11. See United States v. Beatty, 538 F.3d 8, 17 (1st Cir. 2008).
12. See United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2008).
13. See United States v. Richardson, 558 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2009).
14. See United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 1007 (9th Cir. 2009).
15. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347.
16. Id. at 348.
17. See Steven Alan Reiss, Prosecutorial Intent in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
135 U. PA. L. REV. 1365, 1367 (1987) (arguing that one of the most significant drawbacks
of unlimited prosecutorial discretion in criminal cases is a lack of consistency and
predictability); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV.
1175, 1178-80 (1989) (arguing that predictability is a foundational component of the "Rule
of Law" and that judges should therefore adopt clear principles of decision as early in the
jurisprudential development as possible).
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acceptance of responsibility reduction is an adjustment that allows a
defendant to "reduce his offense level and, ultimately, his advisory
sentencing range""8 by assisting "authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
[G]overnment to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
[G]overnment and the court to allocate their resources efficiently. 1 9
In Divens, the precise legal issue was whether the government has the
power to condition a section 3E1.1 motion on the refusal by a
defendant to waive appellate rights. The Fourth Circuit split with its
sister circuits when it decided that section 3E1.1(b) should not be
read to place near-unreviewable discretion, a la section 5K1.1, in the
government over section 3E1.1 motions. The decision in Divens
reflects a new analysis of section 3EL.1(b) that relies on the plain
language of the Guidelines and their commentary instead of
congressional intent. The Fourth Circuit's approach has already
guided the Second Circuit's analysis in United States v. Lee,2" and the
circuit split raises interesting questions about the acceptance of
responsibility scheme that the Supreme Court of the United States
should resolve.
Part I provides background on the Guidelines and case law
regarding the Government's discretion to refuse to move for extra
reduction under section 3E1.1(b) when a defendant signs an
acceptance of responsibility statement but refuses to sign a plea
agreement waiving appellate review. Part II summarizes the facts and
holding of the district court's decision in United States v. Divens,
outlines the contours of the Fourth Circuit's recent opinion, and
argues that Divens was correctly decided. Part III analyzes the legal
effect of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Divens, which created a
circuit split, and argues that the Supreme Court should not only grant
certiorari to resolve the circuit split surrounding the acceptance of
responsibility scheme but should also adopt the Fourth Circuit's
position.
I. BACKGROUND OF ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Before the offense level adjustment based on acceptance of
responsibility was incorporated into the Guidelines, the idea that
accepting responsibility for one's actions could mitigate punishment
18. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 9.
19. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.l(b) (2010).
20. 653 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2011).
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had been present in the criminal adjudication system for decades.21 At
sentencing, whether a defendant cooperated with the authorities
when he was arrested,22 whether a defendant entered a guilty plea or
insisted on having a trial, and whether a defendant's allocution at his
sentencing hearing expressed remorse were all relevant inquiries. 23 A
defendant was usually rewarded with a lower sentence for
cooperating with authorities upon arrest, entering a guilty plea, and
giving a remorseful allocution.24 Thus, well before the introduction of
the Guidelines, defendants who accepted responsibility for their
crimes received lesser sentences than those who do not.25
A. United States Sentencing Guidelines
When Congress originally enacted the Guidelines in 1984,26 it
reduced the common law idea of acceptance of responsibility to a
technical formula. Section 3E1.1 of the Guidelines provided for a
two-level reduction in a defendant's offense level for acceptance of
responsibility.28 While the reduction was not automatic, the primary
purpose of section 3E1.1 was to encourage guilty pleas while at the
same time avoiding an automatic reduction that might be subject to
21. See United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1477-78 (D.C. Cir. 1993) ("Since long
before the Guidelines, the law has allowed sentencing judges to show leniency to
defendants who demonstrate contrition and acceptance of responsibility for their crimes."
(citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 224 (1978); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 751 (1970))).
22. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 11-12.
23. Jones, 997 F.2d at 1478.
24. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT ON THE INITIAL
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND POLICY STATEMENTS 48 (1997), available at http://www
.fd.org/pdf lib/Supplementary%20Report.pdf ("[C]ases in which guilty pleas are entered
result on average in considerably lower sentences.").
25. See, e.g., Comment, The Influence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial
Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204, 206-07 (1956) (stating that in a survey of 140
judges, 66% believed that guilty pleas were relevant at sentencing and 87% of those
indicated that guilty pleas lead to lower sentences).
26. The Guidelines went into effect on November 1, 1987. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1A1.2 (2011).
27. The Guidelines have been described as "a long set of instructions for one chart:
the sentencing table ... which has 43 offense levels, 6 criminal history categories, and 258
sentencing range boxes." Frank 0. Bowman, The Failure of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines: A Structural Analysis, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1315, 1324-25 (2005); see also
supra note 2 (discussing a court's considerations in sentencing according to the
Guidelines).
28. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3El.1(a) (1987). For example, the
Guidelines recommended a sentence of 41 to 51 months for a defendant convicted of an
offense with an offense level of 22 and a criminal history category of I; however, a two-
level reduction in the same defendant's offense level would reduce the recommended
Guidelines sentence to between 33 and 41 months. Id. § 5A.
1270 [Vol. 90
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constitutional challenges. 29 Thus, the original version of section 3E1.1
established the link between a guilty plea and acceptance of
responsibility. 3
On November 1, 1992, the Sentencing Commission added an
extra acceptance of responsibility reduction level as part of the
amendment to the Guidelines.3 The revised Guidelines provided that
a defendant could receive an extra one-level reduction in cases where
the offense level was 16 or greater.3 2 The revision conditioned the
extra reduction's availability on whether "the defendant ha[d]
assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by" either "timely providing complete information to the
[G]overnment concerning his own involvement in the offense" or by
"timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty,
thereby permitting the [G]overnment to avoid preparing for trial and
permitting the court to allocate its resources efficiently."33 The
Sentencing Commission provided the extra one-level reduction based
on the beneficial effects of a guilty plea with regard to trial
preparation and trial court resources.34 The Fourth Circuit found that
29. See Michael M. O'Hear, Remorse, Cooperation, and "Acceptance of
Responsibility": The Structure, Implementation, and Reform of Section 3El.1 of the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1507, 1512-21 (1997) (explaining that conviction
at trial has never precluded a reduction and entertaining a guilty plea has never
guaranteed one).
30. United States v. Jones, 997 F.2d 1475, 1478 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The law also has
long recognized that a defendant's decision to plead guilty is good evidence of acceptance
of responsibility and possibly even sincere remorse." (citing Brady v. United States, 397
U.S. 742, 753 (1970))).
31. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C (2011).
32. The vertical axis of the Sentencing Table's grid represents the offense level, which
is calculated under the appropriate Guideline section and can range from 1 to 43. U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2010). The severity of punishment for an
offense level of 16 ranges, depending on the defendant's criminal history category, from 21
to 57 months. Id. For example, the Guidelines recommend a 21 to 27 month sentence for a
defendant convicted of an offense with an offense level of 16 (e.g., failure to register as a
sex offender) and a criminal history category of I; however, if the same defendant's
criminal history category is VI, then the recommended Guidelines sentence would
increase to 46 to 57 months. Id.
33. Id. § 3EL.1(b).
34. United States v. Lancaster, 112 F.3d 156, 158 (4th Cir. 1997) ("[O]nce the
defendant proves by a preponderance of the evidence that he is eligible for the additional
one-level adjustment, the district court has no discretion to refuse to award it."); see also
Steve Statsinger, Point of Controversy, SECOND CIRCUIT BLOG (Aug. 13, 2011, 12:07
PM), http://circuit2.blogspot.com/2011/08/point-of-controversy.html ("[T]he third
acceptance of responsibility point-although to be completely faithful to guideline lingo, it
is a 'level,' not a 'point,' since 'points' are for criminal history-was something of a given.
As long as the defendant either confessed early on or pled guilty timely, the reduction was
granted.").
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when a defendant satisfied these additional requirements, which are
necessary to move the defendant from the two-level reduction to the
three-level reduction, the district court could not deny his three-level
reduction.35
In 2003, Congress amended section 3E1.1 as part of the
Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of
Children Today Act of 2003 ("PROTECT Act").36 The PROTECT
Act primarily focused on sexual offenses involving children. As
explained by a Senate report, the Act was passed to "restore the
[G]overnment's ability to prosecute child pornography offenses
successfully."37 Representative Tom Feeney offered an amendment to
the PROTECT Act that limited the ability of district courts to depart
from the then-mandatory Guidelines in all cases involving sexual
offenses, not just child porn.38  The Feeney Amendment
("Amendment") was the first act of Congress to directly amend the
Guidelines."9
Additionally, the Amendment updated section 3E1.1(b) by
inserting language "substituting the requirement that the
[G]overnment ... make the motion for the third-level reduction that
currently is in subsection (b)."4 ° The post-Amendment version of
section 3E1.1(b) indicates that the prosecutor's motion should state
"that the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
[G]overnment to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
[G]overnment and the court to allocate their resources efficiently."41
The Amendment did not affect the substantive basis of section 3E1.1
because the determination regarding a timely guilty plea remains
35. Lancaster, 112 F.3d at 158.
36. Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
37. S. REP. No. 108-2, at 1 (2003).
38. See § 401, 117 Stat. at 667-76; see also H.R. REP. No. 108-66, at 58-59 (2003)
(Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2003 U.S.C.C.A.N. 683, 693 (noting that section 401 of the Act
"addresses the longstanding problem of downward departures from the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines").
39. United States v. Detwiler, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1166, 1171 (D. Or. 2004). However,
although the Feeney Amendment was the result of a congressional directive, "the
Commission amended the language of this adjustment, [G]uideline section 3E1.1(b), to
require a [G]overnment motion for the third point.... [a]nd the Commission justified it
on the theory that only the [G]overnment knew whether its resources had truly been
conserved." Statsinger, supra note 34.
40. United States v. Richins, 429 F. Supp. 2d 1259, 1263 (D. Utah 2006).
41. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2010).
1272 [Vol. 90
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substantially the same; however, the Amendment changed who
initiates and requires deference to the decision of the prosecutor.42
In practice, the original two-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility under section 3E1.1(a) gave most defendants a 20%
sentence reduction for pleading guilty.43 The additional one-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section 3E1.1(b)
raises the sentence reduction to 28% for sparing the Government the
cost of preparing for trial.44 Thus, under section 3E1.1(a), a
hypothetical defendant's sentence of 51 months could be reduced to
41 months, and if the same defendant were given the additional
acceptance of responsibility reduction under section 3EL.1(b), the
sentence could be further reduced to 37 months. 45 Therefore, the
structure of the Guidelines rewards a hypothetical defendant with a
14-month reduction to his sentence for deciding to plead guilty and
waiving the right to trial.
B. Case Law
Since section 3E1.1(b) was amended in 2003, there has been little
litigation regarding the additional one-level reduction.46 Circuit courts
other than the Fourth Circuit have concluded that the Government
has the discretion to refuse to file the motion for the third-level
reduction for acceptance of responsibility based on a variety of
reasons.47 These courts have relied on Wade v. United States48 and
42. United States v. Johnson, 581 F.3d 994, 1010 (9th Cir. 2009) (Smith, J., dissenting
in part, but concurring in the judgment); see also United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d
1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (noting that with the exception of giving the Government
discretion to file a motion, "the language of section 3E1.1(b) tracks the former language of
section 3E1.1(b)(2)").
43. Ricardo J. Bascuas, The American Inquisition: Sentencing After the Federal
Guidelines, 45 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 42 (2010) ("That suggests that, putting collateral
consequences of a conviction (such as reduced employability, loss of civil rights, or
deportation) aside, a defendant would go to trial only if he believed that his chance of
acquittal was at least 20%.").
44. Id. at 43 ("[M]eaning a defendant who believed the [G]overnment had only a 72%
chance of convicting him would plead guilty."); see also Julie R. O'Sullivan, In Defense of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines' Modified Real-Offense System, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1342,
1415 & n.274 (1997) (collecting sources to support the assertion that, on average, a three-
level reduction equals a 35% reduction in the sentence).
45. See Bascuas, supra note 43, at 42 n.263, 43.
46. Statsinger, supra note 34; see also Sentencing Guidelines, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV.
CRIM. PROC. 699, 715 n.2130 (2010) (collecting section 3E .1(b) cases).
47. See, e.g., Johnson, 581 F.3d at 1006-07 (declining to recommend additional
reduction because defendant pursued appeal); United States v. Richardson, 558 F.3d 680,
682-83 (7th Cir. 2009) (refusing to file Rule 35(b) motion because defendant pursued
appeal of conviction); United States v. Beatty, 538 F.3d 8, 16-17 (1st Cir. 2008) (contesting
the court's failure to award a sentencing reduction for defendant's cooperation with the
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United States v. Butler4 9 in interpreting section 5K1.1, a provision of
the Guidelines that allows the Government broad discretion to
determine whether the defendant has provided substantial assistance
to the Government and whether to file a motion for a downward
departure. 50  They use section 5K1.1 to interpret the added
requirement of "[u]pon motion of the Government" in section 3E1.1
and conclude that the third-level reduction is no longer based on trial
preparation, but instead on the presence or absence of the
Government's motion. 51 Other circuits rely on the legislative history
when applying section 3E1.1, specifically the change from the prior
version to the Amendment's 2003 language.52
The Fourth Circuit discussed the amended version of section
3E1.1(b) in United States v. Chase.53 In Chase, the defendant entered
a plea agreement with the Government, in which the Government
agreed to move for the third-level reduction for acceptance of
responsibility if the defendant met certain conditions. 54 Although the
probation officer recommended that Chase receive credit for
acceptance of responsibility and the district court concluded that he
should get credit, the Government did not file a motion and Chase
did not receive the full three-level reduction.55 Chase raised the issue
too late for the court to consider the underlying issue-whether the
Government could refuse to move for an extra one-level reduction
based on an arbitrary position, there the defendant's refusal to waive
his appellate rights.56
Chase appealed to the Fourth Circuit and made two arguments:
(1) the Government breached the plea agreement by failing to file an
government); United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374, 376 (5th Cir. 2008) (disputing the
Government's failure to recommend sentencing reduction because defendant did not
waive his appellate rights).
48. 504 U.S. 181 (1992).
49. 272 F.3d 683 (4th Cir. 2001).
50. United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 345 (4th Cir. 2011); see also Brief of
Appellant, supra note 2, at 10 (discussing the similarity between sections 3E1.1(b) and
5K1.1 in requiring a Government motion).
51. See, e.g., Beatty, 538 F.3d at 15-16 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 5K1.1 (2003) and determining whether the Government was satisfied with the
defendant's acceptance of responsibility).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Espinoza-Cano, 456 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006).
53. 466 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2006).
54. Id. at 312 (stating that the defendant had to provide information about his
criminal conduct and pay a special assessment fee within forty days of the entry of his
guilty plea).
55. Id. at 312-13.
56. Id. at 314 n.2 ("Because Chase did not raise this argument in his brief, it is
waived.").
1274 [Vol. 90
ACCEPTANCE OF RESPONSIBILITY
acceptance of responsibility motion; and (2) in light of United States v.
Booker,57 the district court had the discretion to give him the third-
level reduction without the Government's motion. 58 The Fourth
Circuit rejected both arguments. 59 The underlying issue was also not
addressed because Chase raised it for the first time at oral argument.6 °
In Divens, the Fourth Circuit discussed the Wade and Butler6
standard, admitting that "[i]f ... section 5K1.1 reductions were to
control cases like this one, involving section 3E1.1(b) reductions,
Divens could not prevail."62 However, the court found that the
specific question in Divens had not yet been answered: whether the
Government has discretion to refuse to move for extra acceptance of
responsibility reduction under section 3E1.1(b).63 The Fourth Circuit
concluded, in light of the entire history of the provision, that the
Government did not have discretion to refuse to move for an extra
acceptance of responsibility reduction based on a defendant's refusal
to waive appellate rights."
II. UNITED STATES V. DIVENS
On April 3, 2009, detectives with the Charleston, West Virginia
Police Department were engaged in an undercover prostitution sting
on the city's west side.65 While watching for signs of activity,
detectives observed suspicious behavior near a gold Pontiac that was
consistent with a drug transaction taking place.66 Detectives noticed
the car had one headlight out and decided to approach it.67 As they
did, Leshawn Dwayne Divens, the passenger in the car, got out and
started to flee.68 Detectives observed Divens throw a baggie that
57. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
58. Chase, 466 F.3d at 313-16. Chase argued "that a Government motion is no longer
required in order to authorize the additional reduction now that United States v. Booker
... has rendered the guidelines advisory only." Id. at 315. The court found that Chase's
argument was incorrect and restated "[tlhat the guidelines are non-binding in the wake of
Booker does not mean that they are irrelevant to the imposition of a sentence." Id.
(quoting United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2006)).
59. Id.
60. Id. at 314 n.2.
61. See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text.
62. United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343,345 (4th Cir. 2011).
63. Id. at 345.
64. Id. at 347.
65. Brief of Appellee at 3, United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343 (4th Cir. 2011) (No.
09-4967).
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
2012] 1275
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contained crack cocaine, which they recovered after Divens was
arrested.69
A. United States District Court
Divens was charged with a one-count indictment of "possession
with intent to distribute a quantity of cocaine base in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)."7 ° The proposed plea agreement contained a
provision that waived the appellate rights of both Divens and the
Government.71 The plea agreement stated that Divens "knowingly
and voluntarily waives his right to seek appellate review of any
sentence of imprisonment or fine imposed by the District Court on
any other ground, so long as that sentence is below or within the
Sentencing Guideline range determined by the District Court prior to
any variance. '7 2 Divens signed an acceptance of responsibility
statement, but declined to sign the plea agreement because it
contained the appellate waiver and instead pleaded guilty to
distributing cocaine without the benefit of the plea agreement.73
Before the sentencing hearing, the probation officer drafted a
Presentence Investigation Report ("PSR").74 He suggested a two-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under section
3E1.1(a),75 stating that he did not anticipate that the Government
would move for an additional one-level reduction under section
3E1.1(b) since the defendant did not sign the plea agreement.76 In
Divens's sentencing memorandum, Divens objected to the PSR
Guidelines calculation because he did not receive the additional one-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.77 The Government
responded that it would not move for the additional one-level
reduction because it "ha[d] a legitimate interest in preserving
[G]overnment resources, not just prior to judgment, but also after
judgment in appeal and collateral review proceedings."78
On October 13, 2009, Judge Joseph R. Goodwin of the U.S.
District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held a
69. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 3.
70. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 4.
71. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 3. "Appellate rights" included "both
proceedings on direct appeal and collateral review under 28 U.S.C. § 2255." Id. at 3 n.1.
72. Id. at 3.
73. Id. at 3-4.
74. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 4.
75. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 4.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 4-5.
78. Id. at 5.
1276 [Vol. 90
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sentencing hearing for Divens.79 Divens argued that since the
Government did not move for the additional one-level reduction
because Divens declined to sign the plea agreement, the court should
compel the Government to do so since the Government's reasons
were not rationally related to the legitimate governmental interest
described in section 3E1.1.80 Judge Goodwin heard argument
regarding Divens's objection to the Government's decision not to
move for the additional one-level reduction.81 The Government
acknowledged that its rationale for withholding the one-level
reduction was because "[Divens] refused to execute the appellate
waiver."82 Judge Goodwin overruled Divens's objection, finding that
"the statute is clear and unambiguous and requires the Government
to make the motion before the Court has the discretion to award the
point."83 The district court sentenced Divens to a 36-month prison
term, and Divens appealed.84
B. Fourth Circuit
Divens's appeal challenged Judge Goodwin's decision not to
compel the Government to move for the section 3E1.1 reduction.85
The Government's principal argument was that "Divens' failure to
sign the appellate waiver justifie[d] the Government's refusal to move
for the additional one-level reduction under [section] 3E1.1(b). 8 6
Therefore, the fundamental issue for the Fourth Circuit was whether
section 3E1.1(b) allows the Government to withhold the additional
79. See id.
80. Id. Divens also argued that the district court should calculate his sentence using a
1-to-1 crack/powder cocaine ratio. Id. at 4-5. Judge Goodwin stated that he would "make
an adjustment," id. at 5, regarding the powder-to-crack cocaine ratio and imposed a 20:1
ratio. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 5. Divens objected "to the disparity [100:1] in
sentencing between offenses involving cocaine base and cocaine powder." Transcript of
Sentencing Hearing at 3, United States v. Divens, No. 2:09-CR-00114 (S.D. W. Va. Oct.
13, 2009), ECF No. 43. This disparity is based on the drug quantity table in the Guidelines,
which is used to determine crack-based offense levels. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL § 2D1.1(c) (2011). Divens objected to the disparity in the Guidelines and argued
"that a 1:1 ratio should be applied." Transcript of Sentencing Hearing, supra, at 3. Judge
Goodwin made an adjustment to a 20:1 ratio, saying: "I categorically disagree with the
disparity as set forth in the [G]uidelines." Id.
81. Brief of Appellant, supra note 2, at 5-6.
82. Id.
83. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 5.
84. Id.
85. United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 344 (4th Cir. 2011).
86. Id. at 345.
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one-level reduction based on its interest in conserving appellate
resources.
8 7
The Fourth Circuit split with other circuits in holding that
although the Government has discretion to refuse to move for the
extra acceptance of responsibility reduction under section 3E1.1(b),
the Government's refusal must be based on "an interest recognized
by the guideline itself-not, as with [section] 5K1.1, on the basis of
any conceivable legitimate interest."88 The Fourth Circuit's reasoning
was trifold: (1) section 5K1.1 cases are inapplicable in interpreting
section 3E1.1(b); (2) judicial interpretation of a Guidelines provision
is controlled by the Guidelines commentary; and (3) in contrast to the
Government's broad discretion under section 5K1.1, the
Government's discretion under section 3E1.1 is much more limited.89
The Fourth Circuit initially focused its analysis on Wade,
determining that Wade was inapplicable in interpreting section
3E1.1(b).9° In Wade, the Supreme Court interpreted section 5K1.1, a
Guidelines provision that provides for a downward departure, upon
the Government's motion, when the defendant has provided
substantial assistance to the Government.91 The Wade Court held that
section 5K1.1 provided the Government a "power, not a duty, to file a
motion."'92 However, the Court recognized that if the "refusal to move
was not rationally related to any legitimate Government end," district
courts could compel the Government to move for the section 5K1.1
reduction. 3
In Butler, the Fourth Circuit interpreted Wade to permit "the
Government to refuse to file a substantial assistance motion under
[section] 5K1.1 so long as it provides any legitimate reason, even one
unrelated to the defendant's 'substantial assistance.' "' Therefore,
the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that if it applied the section 5K1.1
87. Id. at 344-45.
88. Id. at 347; see also Kristen Leddy, Just Deserts for Timely Acceptance of
Responsibility, FOURTH CIRCUIT BLOG (July 8, 2011, 10:01 AM), http://circuit4.blogspot
.com/2011/07/just-deserts-for-timely-acceptance-of.html ("The Fourth Circuit broke with
other circuits in determining that the Government does not enjoy the discretion it does
under sect. 5K1.1 in sect. 3E1.1, finding that sect. 3E1.1 does not require that a defendant
provide the prosecution with assistance that must reduce 'expense and uncertainty' at
attends an appeal." (quoting Divens, 650 F.3d at 348)).
89. Divens, 650 F.3d at 345-48.
90. Id. at 345-47.
91. Wade v. United States, 504 U.S. 181,185 (1992).
92. Id. at 185.
93. Id. at 186.
94. Divens, 650 F.3d at 345 (citing United States v. Butler, 272 F.3d 683, 687 (4th Cir.
2001)).
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standard to Divens's case, which involved section 3E1.1, then Divens
could not win.95 However, the Fourth Circuit declined to apply the
section 5K1.1 standard, finding the issue to be one of first
impression.96 The court noted that "the Government never explicitly
argue[d] that the standard developed in Wade and Butler governs
[section] 3E1.1(b) reductions" and explained that the Guidelines
commentary would make such an argument "untenable."97
C. Why the Fourth Circuit Got It Right
The Fourth Circuit's analysis was correct because the judicial
interpretation of a Guidelines provision is controlled by the
Guidelines commentary unless the commentary is "inconsistent with,
or a plainly erroneous reading of" the Guidelines provision. 98 This is
true even if the Guidelines commentary states a "broader
interpretation" than the Guidelines provision.99 After recognizing
these two principles of Guidelines provision interpretation, °° the
Fourth Circuit focused on two Guidelines commentaries that
indicated that in determining whether to move for the additional one-
level reduction pursuant to section 3E1.1(b), the Government's
discretion is narrow in comparison to the wide discretion allowed
under section 5K1.1.101
First, the Guidelines application commentary to section 3E1.1
states "[s]ubsection (b) provides an additional 1-level decrease in
offense level for a defendant ... who has assisted authorities in the
investigation or prosecution of his own misconduct by taking the steps
set forth in subsection (b)."1 The court emphasized the word
"provides" and explained that the language is significant in the
application commentary to section 3E1.1 because the application
commentary to section 5K1.1 does not use the same language. 10 3
Second, the Guidelines background commentary to section 3E1.1
explains that "[s]uch a defendant has accepted responsibility in a way
that ensures the certainty of his just punishment in a timely manner,
95. Id. (citing United States v. Wiggins, 905 F.2d 51, 53-54 (4th Cir. 1990) (recognizing
the legitimacy of appellate waivers)).
96. Id. (citing United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310, 314 n.2 (4th Cir. 2006)).
97. Id. at 345.
98. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
99. United States v. Mason, 284 F.3d 555, 560 n.1 (4th Cir. 2002).
100. Divens, 650 F.3d at 346-47.
101. Id. at 346.
102. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) cmt. 6 (2010).
103. Divens, 650 F.3d at 346.
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thereby appropriately meriting an additional reduction."'" Here, the
court emphasized the words "thereby" and "meriting" and again
noted that the background commentary to section 5K1.1 does not use
the same language. 10 5 Read together, the Fourth Circuit found that
while both section 3E1.1(b) and section 5K1.1 reductions were
dependent on a "motion of the Government," the Government's
discretion under section 3E1.1(b) to choose to not file a motion was
much more limited than under section 5K1.1.1 6
The court addressed two counterarguments to its Guidelines
commentary analysis: (1) that parts of the Guidelines commentary it
relied upon "originally accompanied a version of section 3E1.1(b)
that lacked the current requirement of a Governmental motion"; and
(2) while the requirement of a Governmental motion was the result of
a congressional directive in the PROTECT Act, the Sentencing
Commission wrote the mandatory language in the Guidelines
commentary. 107 The court found that neither counterargument
affected the persuasive force of the commentary because Congress
delegated the authority to interpret the Guidelines to the Sentencing
Commission, and its commentary both binds the courts and is outside
of Congress's review."'
The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Government has some
discretion regarding whether to file a motion under section
3E1.1(b).'09 The Guidelines commentary for the 2003 amendment
explains that "[b]ecause the Government is in the best position to
determine whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner
that avoids preparing for trial, an adjustment under subsection (b)
may only be granted upon a formal motion by the Government at the
time of sentencing.""11 Once the motion is filed, this sentence narrows
the Government's discretion to the determination under section
3E1.1 of "whether the defendant's assistance has relieved it of
preparing for trial." '111 Under the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of
the section 3E1.1 commentary, if the Government concludes that the
defendant's assistance has relieved it of trial preparation, the
104. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) (2010).
105. Divens, 650 F.3d at 346.
106. Id. at 345-46.
107. Id. at 346 n.1 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b)(2002)).
108. Id. (citing Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 46 (1993)).
109. Id. at 346.
110. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1(b) cmt. 6 (2010) (added by
Congress in PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g), 117 Stat. 650, 671).
111. Divens, 650 F.3d at 346 (emphasis omitted).
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Government does not have discretion to file a section 3E1.1 motion;
rather, the Government must do so.
Additionally, the court explained that the defendant is entitled to
the additional reduction once the Government exercises its discretion
and makes the initial determination that a defendant did alleviate the
burden of trial.112 The court emphasized the commentary's mandatory
terms: the application commentary's provision of the reduction and
the background commentary's determination that a defendant who
meets the criteria merits the reduction.1 3 Thus, the court concluded
that once the Government determines that a defendant satisfies the
requirements of subsection (b), "he becomes entitled to the
reduction." '114 Furthermore, the court noted that the difference in the
Government's discretion and the standard that governs under section
3E1.1 is supported by the absence of any analogous commentary to
section 5K1.1.115
The Government made three other arguments in the Fourth
Circuit for upholding Divens's sentence, and the court rejected all
three. First, the Government argued that appellate waivers serve its
interest in avoiding expense and uncertainty due to appellate and
collateral attacks."6 The court determined that section 3EL.1(b) only
requires that the defendant "timely" enter a "plea of guilty," which
Divens did with a "confession of guilt in open court."1117 Moreover,
the court found that the text of section 3E1.1(b), which evinces a
concern for efficient allocation of resources, is a concern for "trial
resources, not appellate resources." ' 8
Second, the Government argued that conserving appellate
resources is "closely related" to the interests that are recognized in
section 3E1.1(b), "namely, to avoid the expense and uncertainty of
having to defend defendant's conviction and sentence on appeal and
112. Id.
113. Id. The Guidelines application commentary to section 3E1.1 states "[s]ubsection
(b) provides an additional 1-level decrease in offense level for a defendant ... who has
assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own conduct by taking the
steps set forth in subsection (b)." U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3EL1(b)
cmt. 6 (2010) (emphasis added). The Guidelines background commentary to section 3E1.1
explains that "[s]uch a defendant has accepted responsibility in a way that ensures the
certainty of his just punishment in a timely manner, thereby appropriately meriting an
additional reduction." Id. § 3EL.1(b) (emphasis added).
114. Divens, 650 F.3d at 346.
115. Id.
116. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 9.
117. Divens, 650 F.3d at 348.
118. Id.
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collateral attack."' 19 The court found no basis in the Guidelines
provision itself that would justify the Government creating "closely
related" interests recognized in section 3E1.1(b).120 The court
explained that "[section] 3E1.1(b) requires the Government to
consider the specific factors articulated in the guideline itself, not
some other criterion that it believes to be 'closely related' to the
textual requirement.' 12' Furthermore, the Government failed to offer
any evidence to support its position that appellate waivers further the
interests recognized by Congress in amending section 3E1.1(b).
Third, the Government argued that its decision to mandate an
appellate waiver before it moved for a section 3E1.l(b) reduction was
necessary to protect it from spending resources "anticipating, and
ultimately defending, a complete appeal. ' 123 The court explained that
the Government's argument failed to take into account that an
unconditional guilty plea itself limits appellate and collateral
attacks. 124 This is because attacks regarding whether the plea "was
both counseled and voluntary" 125 are out of the reach of any
permissible appellate waiver. 26 Therefore, the Government's interest
in avoiding the anticipation of such a challenge would not be affected
by a defendant's refusal to sign an appellate waiver.
The Fourth Circuit split with other circuits on the additional one-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility because it refused to
rely on section 5K1.1 cases to interpret section 3El.1(b). 27 The
Fourth Circuit found that the commentary to section 3E1.1(b)
mandated a different analysis and pointed out that the commentary
"has received little attention from our sister circuits."'' 28 The court
also contrasted its analysis with other circuits that focused on
Congress's amendment to section 3E1.l(b) to mandate that the
119. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 9.
120. Divens, 650 F.3d at 349.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Brief of Appellee, supra note 65, at 10 (quoting United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d
374, 378 (5th Cir. 2008)).
124. Divens, 650 F.3d at 350.
125. Id. (quoting United States v. Broce, 488 U.S. 563, 569 (1989)).
126. Id. (citing United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 169 (4th Cir. 2005) (acknowledging
that involuntary or unintelligently entered into appellate waivers have no legal or binding
force)).
127. Id. at 347.
128. Id.
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additional one-level reduction be initiated upon Government
motion. 129
The Fourth Circuit explained that the other circuits found the
2003 amendment itself to demonstrate Congress's intent that the
Government be allowed the same broad discretion under section
3E1.1(b) as under section 5K1.1.13 ° The court rejected this approach,
stating, "nothing in the 2003 reforms evinces such an intent."'13' The
court reasoned that when Congress added the requirement of the
Government's motion to section 3E1.1(b), it could have amended the
provision's commentary to conform to the section 5K1.1 commentary,
but it chose not to do so. 3 2 Therefore, in leaving the section 3E1.1(b)
commentary unchanged, the commentary's mandatory language
regarding "provides," "thereby," and "meriting" would only be
applicable to "whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a
manner that avoids preparing for trial."' 133
As support for its disagreement with the other circuits, the court
cited the Supreme Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA,' which
held that "a statutory grant of discretion is 'not a roving license to
ignore the statutory text' but is instead a 'direction to exercise
discretion within defined statutory limits.' "1315 The Fourth Circuit
again emphasized the Government's failure to defend this
approach. 136 Specifically, "that Congress's insertion into § 3EL.1(b) of
the government motion requirement reveals an intent to confer upon
the Government the wide discretion provided it under § 5K1.1.' 3 It
reasoned that the Government lacked an argument at all for the same
broad discretion under section 3EL.1(b) that it has under section
5K1.1. 38 Given that the judicial interpretation of a Guidelines
129. Id. (citing PROTECT Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, § 401(g), 117 Stat. 650,
671).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. "After all, Congress could have amended the § 3E1.1(b) commentary so that it
conformed to the commentary surrounding § 5K1.1." Id.
133. Id. (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 3E1.1 cmt. 6 (2003)).
"Congress declined to do so; it instead left unchanged § 3El.l(b)'s mandatory
commentary and inserted language suggesting that the Government's newfound discretion
applies only to the question of 'whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner
that avoids preparing for trial.' "Id.
134. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
135. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 (quoting EPA, 549 U.S. at 533).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
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provision is controlled by the Guidelines commentary, 3 9 the Fourth
Circuit's analysis may prove to be unassailable.
III. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF DIVENS ON UNITED STATES
SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Fourth Circuit indicated its awareness of the split with four
other circuits regarding prosecutor discretion in the additional one-
level reduction for acceptance of responsibility.140 Specifically, in
splitting with the First, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits,' the
Fourth Circuit noted the other circuits' conclusion that it is within the
Government's discretion to predicate its decision to not move for a
section 3E1.1(b) reduction on any rational interest.'42 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that these cases principally relied on cases
interpreting section 5K1.1. 43 It also disagreed with the other circuits'
reasoning that Congress's amendment to section 3E1.1(b), which
requires the Government motion, "reveals an intent to confer upon
the Government the wide discretion provided it under [section]5K1.1. '' 111
A. The Fourth Circuit and Limitations on Its Effect Elsewhere
The Fourth Circuit's analysis in Divens has already guided the
Second Circuit in United States v. Lee.'45 In Lee, defendant Chris Lee
pleaded guilty to a four-count indictment for narcotics violations
without the benefit of a plea agreement.1 46 Lee objected to certain
findings in the PSR, and a Fatico hearing 47 was scheduled. 14 Just
prior to the scheduled hearing, Lee withdrew most of his objections
139. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 (1993).
140. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 ("We recognize that this holding does not accord with that
of other circuits.").
141. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
142. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 (citing United States v. Deberry, 576 F.3d 708 (7th Cir.
2009)); see United States v. Johnson, 581 F.2d 994, 1002 (9th Cir. 2009); United States v.
Beatty, 538 F.3d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 2008) (stating that the Government's discretion under
section 3E1.1(b) is "nearly unfettered"); United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374, 378 (5th
Cir. 2008)).
143. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 (citing Beatty, 538 F.3d at 15).
144. Id.
145. 653 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2011).
146. Id. at 172.
147. A Fatico hearing is "[a] sentencing hearing at which the prosecution and the
defense may present evidence about what the defendant's sentence should be." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009) (citing United States v. Fatico, 603 F.2d 1053 (2d
Cir. 1979)).
148. Lee, 653 F.3d at 172.
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and the court resolved the issue in the Government's favor. 149 At
Lee's sentencing, the Government refused to move for the additional
one-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility, and the district
court denied Lee's request to compel the Government to make the
motion.150
On appeal, the Second Circuit reversed, finding that although a
Government motion is "a necessary prerequisite" to the additional
one-level reduction, the district court can grant the additional
reduction in two situations without a Government motion: (1) if the
Government's refusal is based on an unconstitutional motive; or (2) if
the Government acts in bad faith when a plea agreement leaves the
decision to move to the Government's discretion.5 The Second
Circuit based its reasoning on the plain language of section 3E1.1(b),
the application commentary for section 3E1.1(b), and the court's
conclusion that a defendant has a due process right to object to errors
in the PSR.152
Moreover, the Second Circuit found the Fourth Circuit's decision
in Divens "instructive" because the Fourth Circuit's "observations"
applied with "equal force" in Lee's case. 153 The Second Circuit quoted
149. Id. The Fatico hearing was limited to Lee's objection to the PSR's finding "that he
had threatened to kill certain drug couriers who he feared might cooperate with law
enforcement officers." id.
150. Id. Similar to Divens, the Government agreed to a two-level reduction for
acceptance of responsibility under section 3El.1(a), but refused to move for the additional
one-level reduction under section 3E1.1(b) because "the defendant required the
Government to undergo extensive preparation for a Fatico hearing on multiple sentencing
issues" which the Government said "was akin to preparing for trial." Id.
151. Id. at 173 (holding "that the Government's refusal to move for a third-point
reduction under [section] 3E1.1(b) in this case was based on an unlawful reason, as the
Government could not refuse to move on the grounds that it had been required to prepare
for a Fatico hearing"); see also Statsinger, supra note 34 ("[In Lee], since there was no plea
agreement, only the first option was available, but the circuit found that it was met,
although the court seemingly identified an alternative reason for granting the point: the
[G]overnment's reason for not making the motion was based on an 'unlawful'-although
perhaps not unconstitutional-reason: the refusal was not permitted by the [G]uideline
itself, which addresses only avoiding preparing for 'trial.' While Lee put the [G]overnment
to its burden at a Fatico hearing, he undisputedly pled guilty early on and 'spared the
Government from preparing for trial.'" (quoting Lee, 653 F.3d at 174)).
152. Lee, 653 F.3d at 174 (citing United States v. Eschman, 227 F.3d 886, 890 (7th Cir.
2000) ("Criminal defendants ... have a due process right to be sentenced on the basis of
reliable information.")); see also Statsinger, supra note 34 ("Thus, under the 'plain
language' of the [G]uideline, 'the [G]overnment's refusal' was 'not justified.' The court [in
Lee] also noted that the commentary to [section] 3E1.1-which is binding-likewise limits
the determination to whether the [G]overnment has saved resources by avoiding
preparing for trial.").
153. Lee, 653 F.3d at 174-75.
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the Fourth Circuit's holding in Divens, which stated that section
3E1.1(b)
instructs the Government to determine simply whether the
defendant has "timely" entered a "plea of guilty" and thus
furthered the guideline's purpose in that manner. It does not
permit the Government to withhold a motion for a one-level
reduction because the defendant has declined to perform some
other act to assist the Government. 154
Furthermore, the Second Circuit's reasoning, relying on the plain
language of section 3E1.1(b) and the commentary for section
3El.l(b), mirrored the Fourth Circuit's analysis.'55
While the Fourth Circuit's analysis guided the Second Circuit,
thereby adding to the circuit split over acceptance of responsibility,
there is a direct conflict with the Fifth 56 and Seventh Circuits.157
However, the Fourth Circuit recognized that its holding in Divens
would not require a different result in two other circuits' cases that
seem to directly state the contrary proposition because the outcome
would be the same under the Fourth Circuit's analysis.'58 First, in the
Ninth Circuit case of United States v. Johnson,'59 after the district
court denied the defendant's suppression motion, he entered a
conditional guilty plea that reserved his right to appeal the district
court's decision."6 Second, in the First Circuit case of United States v.
Beatty," ' almost sixteen months after being indicted, the defendant
pleaded guilty to four counts of drug distribution; however, "the
Government invested significant time and resources" to prove the
facts at issue.162 The Fourth Circuit stated that "[i]n both cases, the
Government well could have properly withheld a [section] 3E1.1(b)
motion on the ground that the defendant failed to 'timely' enter a
true guilty plea sufficient to relieve it of the burden of trial
preparation."' 63 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit's decision in Divens
154. Id. at 175 (quoting United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2011)).
155. Id. at 174; see also Divens, 650 F.3d at 348 (determining that section 3El1(b) only
requires that the defendant "timely" enter a "plea of guilty").
156. See United States v. Newson, 515 F.3d 374,378-79 (5th Cir. 2008).
157. See United States v. Richardson, 558 F.3d 680, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2009).
158. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 n.2.
159. 581 F.2d 994 (9th Cir. 2009).
160. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 n.2 (citing United States v. Johnson, 581 F.2d 994, 998 (9th
Cir. 2009)).
161. 538 F.3d 8 (1st Cir. 2008).
162. Id. at 10, 12.
163. Divens, 650 F.3d at 347 n.2.
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brought into equipoise the circuit split on the extra acceptance of
responsibility reduction.
IV. A RECOMMENDATION FOR CERTIORARI
A. Worthy of a Grant of Certiorari
In light of the Fourth Circuit's decision in Divens, the Supreme
Court should be petitioned to grant certiorari. As such, it is important
to consider the significance that the Divens decision will have for the
Court. Particularly in the Roberts Court where circuit splits have
become even more important predictors of certiorari grants, 164 Divens
provides "the oft-needed circuit split to foster SCOTUS review." '165
Furthermore, if the Supreme Court does grant certiorari, it
should adopt the rationale in Divens because the Fourth Circuit's
analysis is logical, clear, and furthers the Guidelines' purpose of
conserving scarce trial resources. Generally, there is an "institutional
predisposition against granting certiorari."' 66 However, in selecting
the few cases that will be granted certiorari, experts suggest that "law
clerks will focus on objective factors to guide their inquiry, most
notably the presence or absence of a split among the lower courts on
an issue of federal law." '167 The circuit split regarding acceptance of
responsibility presents an objectively identifiable characteristic
164. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court's Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in
the Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 981 (2007) ("In recent years [Chief Justice
Rehnquist's last two years and the first year for Chief Justice Roberts on the Court], lower
court conflict has become an increasingly important factor guiding the certiorari decisions
of the Court.... Evaluating petitions for certiorari, lower court opinions, and the Court's
opinion to determine whether a case involved a lower court conflict, the study determined
that nearly 70% of the cases reviewed by the Court involved a split among the lower
courts.").
165. Douglas A. Berman, First Circuit Affirms Douglas, Holding Lower FSA Crack
Minimums Apply in Pipeline Cases, SENT'G L. & POL'Y BLOG (May 31, 2011, 4:39 PM),
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing-law-and-policy/2011/05/first-circuit-affirms-
douglas-and-hold-new-lower-fsa-crack-minimums-apply-in-pipeline-cases.html.
166. Stras, supra note 164, at 972.
167. Id. at 976; see also Tracey E. George & Chris Guthrie, Remaking the United States
Supreme Court in the Courts' of Appeals Image, 58 DUKE L.J. 1439, 1448-49 (2009)
(stating that over the past twenty years, in more than one-third of the cases for which the
Supreme Court has granted certiorari, the reason stated was a circuit split); Stras, supra
note 164, at 976 n.183 (citing ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, SORCERERS'
APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
132 (2006) ("[S]tating that 'clerks, lacking institutional memory and a broad outline of the
Court's trends, focused on the observable features of the cases that could be justified as
being cert-worthy' and noting a former clerk's conclusion that a circuit conflict was the
first thing clerks would look for in a petition for review.").
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because it involves a direct conflict between the Fourth Circuit and
the Fifth and Seventh Circuits. Therefore, the likelihood of a grant of
certiorari is greater. For the reasons discussed below, the Supreme
Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split regarding the
acceptance of responsibility scheme.
B. Compelling Reasons for a Grant of Certiorari
First, and most importantly, the Supreme Court should grant
certiorari to resolve the circuit split over acceptance of responsibility
because this issue affects the majority of federal criminal sentences. If
the Court were to grant certiorari, it is unclear whether the issue
would be the narrow issue of whether the government has the power
to condition a section 3E1.1 motion on a refusal by defendant to
waive appellate rights, or the broader issue of whether section
3E1.1(b) should be read to place near-unreviewable discretion, a la
section 5K1.1, with the government over section 3E1.1 motions.'68 In
2010, the section 3E1.1 acceptance of responsibility reduction was
applied to 72,926 offenses-94.2% of all offenses. 169 Specifically, 60%
of defendants received a three-level reduction, 34.9% of defendants
received a two-level reduction, and only 5.1% of defendants did not
receive a reduction because they did not accept responsibility.17
Furthermore, there are at least three secondary reasons that the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari on this issue: (1) the high cost
of a defendant's decision to go to trial; (2) Chief Justice Taft's vision
regarding Supreme Court objectives as embodied in Supreme Court
Rule 10; and (3) the Supreme Court's position allows it to resolve the
conflict in sentencing since it involves the scope of trial court
discretion.
First, the reduction for acceptance of responsibility motivates
guilty pleas. Importantly, "[i]n many cases the anticipated three-point
reduction is the only incentive defendants have to plead guilty rather
than go to trial."'71 The structure of the Guidelines gives federal
168. E-mail from Eric L. Muller, Dan K. Moore Distinguished Professor, to author
(Apr. 9, 2012) (on file with the North Carolina Law Review).
169. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, CHAPTER THREE ADJUSTMENTS 2 (2010), available
at http://www.ussc.gov/Data andStatistics[FederalSentencingStatistics/Guideline
_ApplicationFrequencies/2010/10_chapter3.pdf.
170. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOKS, TABLE 18, OFFENDERS RECEIVING
EACH CHAPTER THREE GUIDELINE ADJUSTMENT (2010), available at http://www.ussc
.gov/Data andStatistics/Annual_Reports andSourcebooks/2010/Tablel8.pdf.
171. Margareth Etienne, Acceptance of Responsibility and Plea Bargaining Under the
Feeney Amendment, 16 FED. SENT'G REP. 109, 109 (2003).
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defendants a strong incentive to waive their trial rights because it
offers "substantial across-the-board" sentencing reductions for
defendants who decide to plead guilty rather than go to trial. 72 Thus,
by pleading guilty and waiving the right to trial, a defendant is all but
guaranteed the acceptance of responsibility offense level reduction.173
"[S]ince the inception of the Guidelines, the [Second] circuit has held
to the fiction that institutionalizing lower sentences for defendants
who plead guilty does not 'punish' going to trial, which would be
unconstitutional, it 'rewards' pleading guilty, which is not."'74
Therefore, the reduction for acceptance of responsibility incentivizes
defendants to plead guilty by rewarding them with lower sentences.
Moreover, because "[o]ver ninety-five percent of federal criminal
cases are resolved by guilty pleas"'75 and "[tihe acceptance of
responsibility provision of the sentencing Guidelines is the principal
sentencing inducement for guilty pleas,"' 76 the high cost of a
defendant's decision to go to trial necessitates consistency and
predictability regarding sentence reductions for acceptance of
responsibility.'77 Some scholars argue that unpredictability over the
additional one-level reduction will produce additional protracted plea
negotiations and increased concern for defendants to plead "blind"
without a specific agreement from the Government regarding the
third-level reduction.17 The current circuit split should be resolved so
that when a defendant is forced to weigh the cost of a trial against the
potential reward for pleading guilty, the defendant and his attorney
will be able to accurately predict his criminal sentence.
172. Bascuas, supra note 43, at 42 (citing U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§ 3E1.1(a)-(b) (2009) ("Viewed against the backdrop of the harsh schedule of sentences
the Guidelines prescribe, the acceptance-of-responsibility reduction effects an
abridgement of the right to trial.")); see also Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the
End of Innocence in Federal Criminal Justice, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 79, 130 (2005) (stating
that rates of guilty pleas increased as the Guidelines took effect).
173. Wright, supra note 172, at 131 (reporting about 94% of defendants who pleaded
guilty received the acceptance of responsibility reduction while only 8% of defendants
who went to trial received the acceptance of responsibility reduction).
174. Statsinger, supra note 34. However, as Statsinger points out, there is practically no
difference. Id. ("What's the difference? None, of course, or at least none that can be
articulated.").
175. Etienne, supra note 171, at 112.
176. Id.
177. Cf Arthur D. Hellman, Jumboism and Jurisprudence: The Theory and Practice of
Precedent in the Large Appellate Court, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 541, 544 (1989) (explaining
why "a high degree of consistency and predictability in the law is necessary to the
successful operation of the legal system").
178. Etienne, supra note 171, at 112.
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Second, Chief Justice Taft believed that the Supreme Court
should have broad discretion with regard to which cases it decided to
hear.79 Taft's vision for the Supreme Court was that Congress would
trust the Court "to exercise its discretion responsibly and prudently in
order to accomplish two broad objectives: (i) to resolve important
questions of law and (ii) to maintain uniformity in federal law."1 80
"These Taftian values" are now "embodied ... in Supreme Court
Rule 10..... In 1922, Taft stated that "[w]henever a petition for
certiorari presents a question on which one circuit court of appeals
differs from another, then we let the case come into our court as a
matter of course."' 182
In light of Taft's vision for the Supreme Court as embodied in
Supreme Court Rule 10, the circuit split over acceptance of
responsibility is particularly ripe for a grant of certiorari by the
Roberts Court. In 2005, in his Senate confirmation hearing, Chief
Justice Roberts argued the Court should take more cases in order to
produce federal law that is more uniform and consistent.183 The
Supreme Court's responsibility to maintain uniformity in federal
law,"' originally grounded in Taftian values and now drafted into
Supreme Court Rule 10, supports the providence of granting
certiorari on the federal sentencing circuit split regarding acceptance
of responsibility.
179. Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of
William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363,1364 (2006).
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Stras, supra note 164, at 981 (quoting Sup. Cr. R. 10(a)). "The most objective
indicia of certworthiness, at least as far as the Rules of the Supreme Court are concerned,
[is] whether 'a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict with the
decision of another United States court of appeals on the same important matter.' " Id. at
980 (citing Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court:
Hearing on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922)
(statement of William Howard Taft, Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court)).
183. George & Guthrie, supra note 167, at 1440-41 (citing Confirmation Hearing on the
Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 337 (2005) (statement of John G.
Roberts, Jr.) ("I think [the Court] could contribute more to the clarity and uniformity of
the law by taking more cases.").
184. See Stephen G. Breyer, Reflections on the Role of Appellate Courts: A View from
the Supreme Court, 8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 91, 92 (2006) (arguing that the Supreme
Court is not a court of error correction per se); see also Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D.
McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1405 (1987)
(same). "Rather than correcting errors, then, the Supreme Court is charged with providing
a uniform rule of federal law in areas that require one." Breyer, supra, at 92.
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Third, in Booker, the Supreme Court held that the mandatory
provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional
because they violated the Sixth Amendment.'85 The result of the Sixth
Amendment being applicable to the Guidelines 86 is "that any fact
(other than a prior conviction) which is necessary to support a
sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts established
by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant
or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt."'87 Post-Booker,
although there has been a rise in conflicting interpretations of
Guidelines provisions, the Supreme Court has exhibited "reluctance
to review conflicting interpretations [by courts] of specific
Guidelines."' 88  However, there are two areas of Guidelines
interpretation that are better suited for Supreme Court review than
Sentencing Commission review: (1) appropriate standards for
appellate court review; and (2) scope of trial court discretion. 8 9
The Supreme Court is better suited to review the circuit split
regarding acceptance of responsibility since the issue is a question
regarding the scope of trial court discretion. The Roberts Court has
agreed to review less than half of the identified circuit splits.' 90 Since
the Supreme Court hears so few cases, questions remain as to
whether this particular sentencing issue is too discrete to merit
Supreme Court review or whether the Roberts Court will exercise
judicial modesty if a certiorari petition is filed on the acceptance of
responsibility issue and "defer[] to the Commission's expertise and
obligation to 'periodically review and revise' as appropriate."' 91
The circuit split over acceptance of responsibility has significant
and far-reaching implications. The Fourth Circuit's decision in
185. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 222 (2005). The Supreme Court's remedy
removed the mandatory provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000), id. at 259, which gave
the judge rather than the jury the power to find essential facts. Id. at 235.
186. Id. at 226-27.
187. OFFICE OF GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SELECTED SUPREME
COURT CASES ON SENTENCING ISSUES 26 (2012), available at http://www.ussc.gov/Legal
/CourtDecisions/SupremeCourtCases.pdf
188. Abby Pringle, Comment, Enhancing Sentences for Past Crimes of Violence: The
Unlikely Intersection of Illegal Reentry and Sex Crimes, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
1195, 1203 (2009).
189. Id. at 1203-04.
190. George & Guthrie, supra note 167, at 1449 (citing Tracey E. George & Michael E.
Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of the United States Courts of Appeals En Banc, 9
SUPREME CT. ECON. REV. 171, 193 tbl.2 (2001) (finding that the Supreme Court granted
certiorari petitions in less than half of circuit splits)); see also Stras, supra note 164, at 988
("[T]he Court may be failing to review 200 or more circuit splits each year.").
191. Pringle, supra note 188, at 1203.
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Divens-to look to the plain language of the Guidelines and its
commentary in interpreting section 3E1.l(b) instead of congressional
intent and section 5K1.1 cases-presents a significantly different
approach to analyzing the Guidelines. Furthermore, the
interpretation of a Guidelines provision that affects 60% of all federal
criminal offense sentences has vast significance.
Moreover, although Divens did not address the important due
process implications of the acceptance of responsibility issue, Lee,
which followed the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Divens, did address
those implications. In Lee, the Second Circuit reasoned that "a
defendant-even one who pleads guilty-has a due process right to
reasonably contest errors in the PSR that affect his sentence" and
that "[a] defendant should not be punished for doing sO." '192 The court
further explained that "[i]f there is a good faith dispute as to the
accuracy of factual assertions in the PSR, the defendant's request that
the dispute be resolved is not a permissible reason for the
Government to refuse to make the [section] 3E1.1(b) motion, even if
resolution of the dispute requires a[n] [evidentiary] hearing. "193
According to Steve Statsinger, an Assistant Federal Defender in
Manhattan and contributor to the Second Circuit Blog,
[T]his [Lee] decision clearly implodes that whole line of
reasoning [that institutionalizing lower sentences for defendants
who plead guilty does not "punish" going to trial ... it
"rewards" pleading guilty], since it expressly holds that denying
a defendant the third point for contesting a material sentencing
fact-or at least doing so in "good faith"-"punishes" him for
doing so. This decision should accordingly open the door to a
similar argument that a defendant who goes to trial with a
"good faith" claim that he should be acquitted is entitled to all
three acceptance of responsibility points.194
Because the acceptance of responsibility reduction provides
defendants with a significant incentive to plead guilty rather than go
192. United States v. Lee, 653 F.3d 170,174 (2d Cir. 2011).
193. Id. ("The court, not the Government, imposes sentence, and the court is entitled
to a full and accurate record-as are the parties-before sentence is imposed.").
194. Statsinger, supra note 34. Statsinger goes on to argue that based on the rationale
of the one-level reduction language, the stated purpose is to conserve both Government
and court resources. Id. ("While it is true that the Government knows best whether it has
expended resources, it is not in a better position than the court itself to know whether the
court was inconvenienced by an untimely plea. Accordingly, the Guideline should permit
the court to impose the third point on its own if it concludes that no significant judicial
resources were consumed by an untimely plea of guilty.").
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to trial, it is important to also consider the defendants' due process
rights that are waived as a result of this decision. Therefore, the
circuit split regarding acceptance of responsibility has significant and
universal implications that the Supreme Court should resolve.
CONCLUSION
In Divens, the Fourth Circuit held that the Government could
not base its refusal to move for an acceptance of responsibility
reduction on a defendant's refusal to waive appellate rights.195 This
decision establishes a new analysis of section 3E1.1(b) that is based
on the plain language of the Guidelines and its commentary. Instead
of focusing on congressional intent, which in other circuits gave the
Government broad discretion under section 3E1.1(b) similar to
section 5K1.1, the Fourth Circuit refused to analogize section
3E1.1(b) to section 5K1.1. 6  This approach narrowed the
Government's discretion under section 3E1.l(b) to determine
whether the defendant "timely" entered a "plea of guilty." The
Fourth Circuit correctly split with other circuits over the post-Feeney
amendment's additional one-level acceptance of responsibility
reduction. The court's well-reasoned conclusion under section
3E1.1(b) lends predictability to federal sentencing and may prove to
be unassailable because judicial interpretation of a Guidelines
provision is controlled by the Guidelines commentary. Therefore, the
Supreme Court should grant certiorari to resolve the circuit split over
this acceptance of responsibility issue.
Divens has already guided the Second Circuit's reasoning in Lee,
which increased the existing circuit split over acceptance of
responsibility by following the Fourth Circuit's new analysis. 197 Most
importantly, the acceptance of responsibility circuit split affects 60%
of federal criminal sentences.' Moreover, in addition to the sheer
number of defendants who are affected by the Guidelines provision,
there are other important reasons the Supreme Court should resolve
the circuit split. First, the resulting uncertainty from the circuit split
could affect a defendant's decision to plead guilty or go to trial.
Second, Taftian values embodied in Supreme Court Rule 10 define a
circuit split as a compelling reason to grant a certiorari petition. 19
195. United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 348 (4th Cir. 2011).
196. Id. at 345-47.
197. Lee, 653 F.3d at 174-75.
198. U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, supra note 170.
199. See supra note 184.
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Finally, since the issue involves the scope of trial court discretion, the
Supreme Court is better suited to resolve the controversy than the
Sentencing Commission. Therefore, in light of the circuit split created
by Divens, the Supreme Court should grant certiorari and adopt the
Fourth Circuit's position.
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